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Abstract
The highway and bridge network is a critical infrastructure that allows for the free
transportation of citizens and enables truck-borne freight transportation. Disruption of this
system could be caused by a terrorist attack, natural disaster, growth of population, required
repairs and upgrades, or collapse caused by old age or malfunction. In the event of a disruption
cities and regions can experience increased traffic and supply chain shortages, thus causing
cascading effects throughout surrounding areas. With this motivation, we develop a network
interdiction optimization model to identify a limited subset of roads that, if disrupted, causes the
greatest increase in the weighted sum of shortest path distances associated with a collection of
origin-destination pairs. We apply the model to perform a vulnerability analysis on the network
consisting of interstate highways, U.S. highways, and state highways in Northwest Arkansas.
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Section 1 - Introduction
The highway and bridge system is one of the largest and most critical infrastructures in
the United States containing over 4 million miles of roads and 600 thousand bridges [1, 2].
Disruptions within this network can slow critical transportation of travelers and supply chains
and create expensive repairs or upgrades that are funded by taxpayers. Disruptions can be
improvements, repairs, or nonrecurring traffic incidents which include car wrecks, construction
zones, and inclement weather [3]. In the event of a disruption cities and regions can experience
increased traffic, supply chain shortages, and loss of life which can have cascading effects
throughout surrounding areas, as displayed by the I-35W bridge collapse in Minneapolis. This
bridge fell during rush hour killing 13 people, injuring 145 more, and requiring over 230 million
dollars and a full year to be reinvested in building a new bridge.
In the US funding for the highway and bridge network’s maintenance and upgrades
comes from a combination of federal, state, and local government spending. In 2019 around
$203 billion dollars was spent on the road transportation network with state and local
governments funding 76% and the federal government funding the remaining 24% [4]. It is
estimated that over the next 20 years the US will spend $41 billion dollars per year on road repair
but required funding for repair and operation is estimated to be $53 billion dollars per year.
One way of identifying an effective use of funding is through a vulnerability analysis on
the road and bridge network. Vulnerability in road networks is defined by Berdica [5] as the
“susceptibility to incidents that can result in considerable reductions in road network
serviceability” [5]. A common method to identify critical parts of transportation networks is to
use a full scan approach in which each arc between nodes is iteratively eliminated and the
subsequent cost of this removal are measured in a reduction of network performance [6]. To
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increase the realism of the full scan approach it is common to equate arc travel times to the
amount of congestion along an arc using traffic assignment models [7]. In this form traffic
assignment models allow a researcher to include behavioral responses from travelers which
Nicholson and Dalziell [8] describe as canceling trips, postponing trips, choosing alternate
destinations, choosing a different mode of travel, or choosing a different route [8]. To include all
five behavioral factors a combined travel demand model (CTDM) that considers each behavioral
factor as a probability is used. The CTDM model quickly becomes difficult to solve due to the
complexity of the nested behavioral probabilities and has only been numerically tested on small
experimental networks. Additionally, the CTDM model does not take into consideration capacity
constraints on arcs and does not consider combinations of road disruptions simultaneously.
One way to consider combinations of road disruptions in a directed network is to use
network interdiction modeling. The basic structure of a network interdiction model has a
follower and a leader. The follower runs a network with the goal of maximizing or minimizing
some function while the leader strives to inhibit the objective from occurring by interdicting (i.e.,
damaging or removing) arcs in the followers’ network. The goal of these models is to then find
the most disruptive combination of arcs to remove [9]. Interdiction modelling has previously
been used for many applications, including hospital infection modeling [10], distribution of
hazardous materials [11], and military and security efforts to disrupt enemy supply lines [12].
To model a road network the network users play the role of followers who aim to identify
a shortest origin-destination route, and the leader is a malicious entity allowing for the testing of
network vulnerability. Our model is an extension of the shortest path network interdiction
problem [9], in which the interdictor removes arcs between nodes in a network to maximize the
shortest path length between an origin and destination. Since the original paper on shortest path
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network interdiction, research has considered variants of this problem including a study of
network interdiction with asymmetric information where an interdictor and evader have different
levels of information [13]. Borrero et al. [14] expand upon asymmetric information through a
study of sequential interdiction in which an interdictor does not have initial information but over
time, through the decisions of the evader, learns the structure and arc cost of the network [14].
Most recently, Nguyen and Smith [15] studied a similar interdiction scenario except the
interdictor knows initial information is uniformly distributed between an upper and lower bound
and the interdictor is tasked with maximizing the expected shortest path an evader can take [15].
This thesis contributes an extension of the shortest path network interdiction model that
can be used to run a vulnerability analysis over road networks while considering a combination
of road disruptions with multiple origins and destinations. We apply the network interdiction
model to perform a vulnerability analysis of the Northwest Arkansas highway network and
attempt to detail priority road sections for future funding.
We present the mathematical model in Section 2 and summarize the road network data
used in the model in Section 3. We then experiment with changing the allowable budget and
modifying the model to allow arcs to be interdicted more than once in Section 4 and give
conclusions and proposals for future research in Section 5.
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Section 2 - Methodology
In this section the mathematical formulation and description of the interdiction problem is
described based upon an extension of Israeli and Wood’s shortest path network interdiction
model Israeli and Wood [9] to incorporate multiple origins and destinations. This problem
maximizes the weighted sum of shortest path distances between multiple origin and destination
pairs by choosing a subset of arcs to lengthen.
To define the interdiction model we first define 𝐴 ⊆ 𝑁 × 𝑁 as a set of directed arcs
where 𝑁 defines the set of nodes. Let 𝑐𝑖𝑗 denote the length of arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴, and define a
nonnegative integer variable 𝑧𝑖𝑗 to indicate the number of times arc (𝑖, 𝑗) is interdicted. We
assume each interdiction adds 𝑑𝑖𝑗 > 0 units of length to arc (𝑖, 𝑗), i.e., the interdicted length is
𝑐𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗 .
To develop a mathematical model of the interdiction problem, we begin by formulating a
linear program to represent the weighted sum of shortest path distances given assigned values to
𝑠
𝑧𝑖𝑗 that indicate which arcs have been interdicted. Let 𝑥𝑖𝑗
express the amount of flow on arc (𝑖, 𝑗)

∈ 𝐴 that originates at node 𝑠 ∈ 𝑁 with 𝑤𝑗𝑠 units flowing from source nodes and 𝑤𝑖𝑠 units
consumed by sink nodes. We can then describe the following optimization Model (1) – (3).

Min𝑥

(1)

∑ ∑ (𝑐𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗 )𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑠
𝑠∈𝑁 (𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐴

s.t.
∑
𝑗∈𝑁:(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐴

𝑠
𝑥𝑖𝑗

−

∑
𝑗∈𝑁:(𝑗,𝑖)∈𝐴

𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑠

∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑠 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑠,

= {𝑗∈𝑁\{𝑠}
−𝑤𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑠,

𝑠
𝑥𝑖𝑗
≥ 0, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑁, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴

(2)
∀𝑠, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁

(3)
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Given values for 𝑧𝑖𝑗 , Equation (1) minimizes the weighted sum of interdicted shortest path
distances across all origin-destination pairs subject to flow balance Constraints (2) and
nonnegativity Constraints (3). The model is an uncapacitated multi-commodity flow model in
which a different commodity is used to represent flow originating at each source node 𝑠 ∈ 𝑁,
and 𝑤𝑖𝑠 units of this commodity must be sent from 𝑠 to each node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 \ {𝑠}. The cost per unit
flow on arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴 is described by the interdicted length 𝑐𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗 for arcs (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴.
Constraints (2) require each node 𝑖 ≠ 𝑠 to consume 𝑤𝑖𝑠 units of commodity 𝑠 ∈ 𝑁 while also
implying that a total of ∑𝑗∈𝑁\{𝑠} 𝑤𝑗𝑠 units of commodity 𝑠 ∈ 𝑁 must leave node 𝑠.
To convert the minimization Model (1) – (3) to a maximization model we can take the
dual of the model, letting 𝑢𝑖𝑠 define the dual variable for constraint (2). The dual of the model
(1) – (2) is then given as
Max𝑢

− ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑠 𝑢𝑖𝑠

(4)

𝑠∈𝑁 𝑖∈𝑁∖{𝑠}

s.t.

𝑢𝑖𝑠 − 𝑢𝑗𝑠 ≤ 𝑐𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑖𝑗 𝑧𝑖𝑗 , ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑁, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴

(5)

Due to strong duality, the optimal objective value of Model (4) – (5) is equal to the weighted
sum of interdicted shortest path distances across all origin-destination pairs.
To formulate the interdiction model, we introduce the interdiction variables 𝑧𝑖𝑗 , (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴,
to Model (4) – (5) and include the constraint
∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐴 𝑧𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝐾

(6)

to impose that at most 𝐾 arcs can be interdicted.
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We then created a parameter 𝑙𝑖𝑗 , used in subsequent tests of the model, that defines the
maximum number of times an arc (𝑖, 𝑗) can be interdicted and introduced this parameter to
Model (4) – (5) by including the constraint
𝑧𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑙𝑖𝑗 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴

(7)

Section 3 - Data
This section describes where we obtained the data used in the interdiction model, how
this data was cleaned and filtered, and finally how the data was formatted and input in AMPL
solver.
We used data from the Northwest Arkansas highway network to test and extend the
network interdiction model. Northwest Arkansas is a metropolitan region that hosts four of the
largest cities in Arkansas: Fayetteville, Springdale, Bentonville, and Rogers and is home to the
headquarters for Walmart, Tyson, JB Hunt, and Arc Best, making it a regional hub for
transportation and commerce. This region is growing rapidly as census reports show population
growth is 3.6x higher in Northwest Arkansas than the United States and 8.6x higher than the
state of Arkansas [16]. In the 2030 Northwest Arkansas Regional Transportation Plan there was
an estimated need for $1.9 billion dollars in road construction and improvements, but only an
estimated $411 million dollars in total funding [17]. The increased transportation importance and
high population growth combined with a constrained budget for road improvements in Northwest
Arkansas raises the need to understand where resources should go to effectively improve the
transportation network. We obtained data for interstate and state highways in the Northwest
Arkansas region and summarize below how this data was used to create the sets and parameters
for the network interdiction model.
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The main dataset used to create the network graph containing arcs 𝐴 ⊆ 𝑁 × 𝑁 came from
transportation data in the US Census Bureau’s TIGER/Line Shapefile. A shapefile stores
geospatial data and information on roads, buildings, water features, and other areas useful for
research. To read and manipulate the Arkansas shapefile we created a data frame, using the
Geopandas Python package, containing network information on Washington and Benton
counties’ road network. Utilizing a separate Python package, Folium, we created our first
visualization of the Arkansas road network as detailed in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Visualization of Washington and Benton counties’ road transportation network

The dataset created from the shapefile contained 1,313 nodes with multiple road types and
summary information. To decrease the complexity of the road network municipal, county, and
dead-end roads were filtered from the map, leaving interstate highways, state highways, and U.S.
highways. To further reduce the complexity of the transportation network we utilized the Folium
package to drop pins at intersections of multiple roads. These 34 pins were used to construct the
node set 𝑁 used in the interdiction model.
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Figure 2: Simplified transportation network with node’s visible

The arc set 𝐴 ⊆ 𝑁 × 𝑁 was created by connecting each node to neighboring nodes. In creating
the arc set 𝐴, which contains 110 arcs, the directed arcs (𝑖, 𝑗) and (𝑗, 𝑖) are both created if nodes 𝑖
and 𝑗 are connected by a road, thus allowing for bi-directional flow on the directed graph.
The cost 𝑐𝑖𝑗 for flow between arcs is equal to the distance between (𝑁, 𝑁) node pairs in
miles. These distances were calculated using the latitude and longitude of each node 𝑁 and
plugging these values into the Geopandas geodesic function, which outputs the distance between
the two points based on the shortest path considering the curve of the Earth. Performing the
distance calculations in this manner was done to simplify distance calculations since we created
custom nodes that did not have distance values already populated within the Shapefile dataset.
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The integer budget 𝐾 that constrains the number of interdictions was tested with different
values less than 40, which we viewed as representing a substantial disruption of the 110-arc
network
We assigned weights to the each of the |𝑁|(|𝑁| − 1) origin-destination pairs by giving
each pair (𝑠, 𝑖) a weight 𝑤𝑖𝑠 that defines the number of units of flow from node 𝑠 to node 𝑖; thus,
the higher the value of 𝑤𝑖𝑠 the more important the node pair. We created these weights using
population projections for all cities within Washington and Benton counties based upon the 2025
NWA Regional Transportation Plan [18]. The weight associated with node pair (𝑠, 𝑖) was
computed as
𝑤𝑖𝑠 = 𝛼𝑠 𝛼𝑖 ,

(8)

where 𝛼𝑖 is the proportion defined by the projected population of node 𝑖 divided by the total
projected population of all nodes. In calculating the proportion 𝛼𝑖 associated with each node 𝑖,
we assumed the projected population of node 𝑖 was equal to the projected population of the city
in which node 𝑖 is located divided by the number of nodes in that city.
An example 𝑤𝑖𝑠 calculation using the origin node 22, which is in the town of Gentry, and
the destination node 21, located in Siloam Springs, is given below.
Projected population of Gentry = 3043
Projected population of Siloam Springs = 16227
Projected total population of all areas with 1+ node = 348,241
3,043

𝛼22 =

348,241

𝛼21 =

348,241

16,227

= 0.0087
= 0.046

22
21
𝑤21
= 𝑤22
= 𝛼22 𝛼21 = 0.0087 × 0.046 = 0.0004002
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In the case of Gentry, the value 𝛼22 can be interpreted as the percentage of people within the
network that live in Gentry, which we assume is equal to the proportion of flow that begins or
ends in Gentry. This probability is multiplied in the model by the negative resulting length 𝑢𝑖𝑠 to
proportionally weight the importance of the origin destination pair in the objective. Every
increase in the weight values corresponds with additional cost to travel along that arc. Table 1
summarizes the 𝑎𝑖 values obtained for each node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁.
Table 1: 𝛼𝑖𝑠 values given to each node

Node
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Weight
0.003354
0.003354
0.005367
0.008362
0.006803
0.000010
0.000010
0.032288
0.005367
0.032288
0.032288
0.032288
0.032288
0.032288
0.032288
0.002736
0.002736
0.111156
0.032288
0.111156
0.004537
0.046597
0.008738
0.006831
0.007833
0.002783
0.192691
0.035106
0.007483
0.045342
0.007833

City
Lincoln
Lincoln
Prairie Grove
West Fork
Elkins
N/A
N/A
Fayetteville
Prairie Grove
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Tontitown
Tontitown
Springdale
Fayetteville
Springdale
Bethel Heights
Siloam Springs
Gentry
Cave Springs
Centerton
Highfill
Rogers
Bentonville
Gravette
Bella Vista
Centerton
13

31
32
33
TOTAL

0.035106
0.045342
0.035106
1.000104

Bentonville
Bella Vista
Bentonville

Section 4 - Results
This section details the computational tests and results used to investigate what sections
of roads within the Northwest Arkansas transportation system are interdicted using the shortest
path interdiction model.
Initial Experimental Run
The first test used our original 𝑤𝑖𝑠 values, based on the multiplication of population
densities of source and sink nodes, and set the value of 𝑙𝑖𝑗 equal to one to limit the number of
interdictions on each arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴. The length 𝑑𝑖𝑗 added per interdiction on arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴 was
initially defined to equal 𝑐𝑖𝑗 ; thus, a single interdiction on arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴 initially has the effect of
doubling the length of the arc. This added distance 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is measured as a distance but can be
interpreted to signify an obstruction increasing the time required to travel along an arc. We
solved eight instances of the interdiction model corresponding to each value of interdiction
budget 𝐾 in {5,10, … ,40}. In Table A (provided in the Appendix), we note that 76% of the time
each arc (𝑖, 𝑗) is interdicted (𝑗, 𝑖) is interdicted. This is likely because the objective function
applies identical weights to the shortest path distance from an origin node 𝑠 to a destination node
𝑡 and the shortest path distance from 𝑡 to 𝑠.
We then created a visualization, using Table A (provided in the appendix), detailing
which arcs were interdicted through the eight trials and to what frequency they were interdicted,
as depicted in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Resulting map from experiment 1

In Figure 3 any line that is colored red was interdicted in at least 7 of the 8 instances, orange
lines were interdicted in at least 4 instances, and yellow lines were interdicted in at least 1
instance. Roads surrounding higher density metropolitan regions like Fayetteville, Rogers, and
Springdale were interdicted the most.
Figures 4 and 5 depict the interdiction solutions from the trials with 𝐾 = 15 and 𝐾 = 10.
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Figure 4: Visualization of trial with K = 15

In Figure 4 we see that as the value of 𝐾 decreases the model continues to interdict major
highways between Rogers, Springdale, and Fayetteville and continues to interdict both the (𝑖, 𝑗)
and (𝑗, 𝑖) arcs. A smaller value of 𝐾 means the model can make less interdictions; thus, the
interdictions made for small values of 𝐾 can be considered as roads that are more critical to the
network’s performance. This trend continues in Figure 5, which depicts the visualization of a
trial run with 𝐾 = 10, in this scenario all 5 arcs were interdicted in the (𝑖, 𝑗) and (𝑗, 𝑖) direction
showing that these 5 arcs have a greater impact on the objective than any other arcs.
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Figure 5: Visualization of Trial with K = 10

To investigate how the value of 𝐾 affects the length of routes we looked at the average distance
between four routes in the Northwest Arkansas Region, depicted in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Distance of four routes as K decreases in first experiment

We can see that as the number of interdictions allowed increases so too do the distances of each
route. This increase is most dramatic in the route between Fayetteville and Bentonville
presumably because the model is unable to interdict as many arcs near Fayetteville or
Bentonville when the budget 𝐾 is low, and instead must use up the 𝐾 budget to interdict key arcs
that affect multiple routes, as shown in the five arcs interdicted in Figure 5.
Modification to allow Multiple Arc Interdiction
Many of the arcs interdicted in our first model setup are longer potentially signaling that
because the cost values 𝑑𝑖𝑗 per arc are directly related to the length 𝑐𝑖𝑗 longer arcs may be getting
unfairly interdicted more often. We believe these longer arcs are also getting interdicted more
often because the budgetary cost 𝐾 is 1 no matter the length allowing the model to
disproportionally affect the length of a route while not significantly affecting the 𝐾 number of
interdictions. To create a fairer scenario we allowed the model to interdict an arc multiple times,
up to a set budget for each arc, but standardized the 𝑑𝑖𝑗 value by setting 𝑑𝑖𝑗 = 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴. This
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then allows the model to interdict longer arcs more frequently but the cost on the budget 𝐾 is
more significantly altered. In this set of experiments, we set 𝑙𝑖𝑗 = ⌈𝑐𝑖𝑗 ⌉ for each arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴;
thus, we allow the model to interdict longer arcs more often, but each interdiction adds only 1
unit to the length of an arc. Because we now allow for multiple interdictions on an arc, we
increased the maximum budget 𝐾 to 135, which is the sum of the previous interdicted arc lengths
in Figure 3. We solve 8 instances in this set of experiments corresponding to 𝐾 ∈
{15,30, … ,135} which all solved to optimality in less than 20 seconds.
Figure 7 displays a summary of the results from this set of experiments which allowed
the model more freedom to make interdictions by decreasing the cost associated with the 𝑑𝑖𝑗
values and allowing multiple interdictions on each arc.

Figure 7: Visualization of experiment with modified model (4) – (5)
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Because we allowed the model to have more freedom in choosing which routes to interdict, we
again wanted to look at the same four routes chosen previously to see how the distance of routes
is affected by the budget 𝐾.

Figure 8: Distance between routes as 𝐾 decreases in modified experiment

In Figure 8 most of the route distances still increase as the budget 𝐾 increases, but because the
new modified model had more freedom in interdiction these increases were more gradual than
compared to Figure 7. We can also see that the distance between Siloam Springs and Bentonville
was not altered between any of the trial runs which shows that the model no longer interdicted
arcs between those two cities. The model also did not interdict arcs between Siloam Springs and
Rogers until the maximum budget of 𝐾. Because the second model did not interdict routes to and
from Siloam Springs, we can hypothesize that the arcs from Siloam Springs are not as vulnerable
as those within the 3 major cities, that run along Interstate 49, of Bentonville, Springdale, and
Rogers.
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Section 5 - Conclusion and Future Research
This paper details the use of a shortest path network interdiction problem to model the
vulnerability of road networks by identifying combinations of simultaneous arc disruptions that
maximally increase the weighted shortest path distance between multiple origins and
destinations. This model was tested with a dataset using selected interstate and state highways
from the Northwest Arkansas road transportation network, and was iteratively tested by changing
the number of interdictions allowed.
The model was shown to solve to optimality, with a solve time less than 20 seconds, in a
network with 110 arcs and 1122 origin destination pairs. In both experiments Interstate 49
between Springdale and Rogers, Arkansas Highway 265 between Springdale and Rogers and the
Arkansas Highway 71B Corridor between Springdale and Rogers were interdicted in all trials.
These key arcs make sense as Rogers and Springdale make up a large portion of the population
in Northwest Arkansas but are only directly connected by three arcs whereas Fayetteville, the
largest city in the region, has a greater number of major connections allowing for more potential
routes into the city. After we allowed the model more freedom to decide which routes to interdict
we continued to see similar arcs being interdicted, but did see more emphasis on interdicting arcs
within the Fayetteville area when compared to the first experiment. This could show that the arcs
within the Fayetteville area were unfairly discounted in the first experiment. After both
experiments our model was able to generate solutions that detail what roads are important for
future funding.
This model lays the groundwork for future research that can create a more complete road
network by adding municipal and county roads and including the speed limits on each road.
Future research could seek to identify more accurate weights for the origin and destination pairs
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that could be based on road congestion around the nodes, and instead of calculating distance
based off straight lines these calculations could be found by using the shapefile data to find
distances over roads. Furthermore, future research could use combined demand traffic models
that model behavioral factors in a driver’s decision making. With the addition of speed limits,
more realistic weights for origin and destination pairs, distance values based on road travel, and
behavioral factors the model could be tested more accurately in larger road networks allowing
for a comprehensive vulnerability analysis. Similarly, because the dataset used was filtered to
create more simplicity in running there is room for future testing with larger datasets to find the
limits of the proposed interdiction model’s solving abilities.
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Appendix
The table below contains the sum of interdictions for the arc (𝑁, 𝑁) between all eight
trials using different values of 𝐾. For arcs with a value of 8 these arcs were interdicted in all
eight trials meaning they significantly affected the objective values. We used this table to create
Figure 3.
Table A: Results from experiment 1

Arc
23,15
27,16
26,20
20,26
16,27
20,17
20,19
19,20
17,20
15,23
19,18
27,23
9,14
14,9
13,12
12,13
17,12
12,17
18,19
23,27
26,33
33,26
33,27
27,33
6,7
7,6
21,15
15,21
14,16
22,21

Sum of
Interdictions
8
8
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
23

21,22
25,23
24,25
23,25
22,25
16,14
17,16
25,22
25,24
24,27
26,27
33,31
33,32
29,32

2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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